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The Iraq Paradox: Minority and Group Rights
in a Viable Constitution
MAKAU MUTUA-
INTRODUCTION
On October 15, 2005, an Iraq ravaged by a civil war
spawned by the 2003 American invasion and subsequent
occupation voted to decide the fate of a permanent
constitution for the country.1 Although many Sunni Arabs
took part in the vote, the referendum lost in the three
governorates where they form a majority.2  But the
constitution was approved because opponents only
succeeded in recording "No" votes larger than two-thirds in
only two of Iraq's eighteen provinces, in effect one province
short of a veto. 3 A two-thirds rejection in three of the
provinces would have doomed the charter and the
transition to a regime more autonomous of the American
occupation forces. 4 However, Iraq teeters on the brink of
t Makau Mutua is Professor of Law and Director of the Human Rights Center
at the State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law where he teaches
international human rights, international business transactions, and
international law. Professor Mutua has been a Visiting Professor at Harvard
Law School, the University of Iowa College of Law, and the University of Puerto
Rico School of Law. He is also co-director of the Program on International and
Comparative Legal Studies of the University at Buffalo Baldy Center for Law &
Social Policy.
1. See Dexter Filkens & Robert F. Worth, Monitors in Iraq Review the 'Yes'
Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2005, at Al; Editorial, Iraq's Referendum, WASH.
POST, Oct. 16, 2005, at B6.
2. See Edward Wong, Referendum Results; Iraqi Constitution Vote Split on
Ethnic and Sect Lines; Election Panel Reports No Major Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2005, § 1, at 4; see also, IRAQ CONST., available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/AR20051
01201450.html.
3. See Anne Barnard, Constitution Passes Amid Sunni Opposition, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 26, 2005, at A14.
4. See id.
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collapse months after the referendum, national elections,
and the formation of a so-called government of national
unity. 5 The American ouster of President Saddam Hussein
and the dominant Sunni minority from power opened a
Pandora's Box that may force the partition of Iraq into
three separate states. 6 This Essay argues that only a
popularly legitimate accommodation of minority and group
rights in a democratic constitutional framework, a virtually
impossible challenge, can avert the disintegration of Iraq.
Virtually all states have minority populations that
belong either to a national, ethnic, religious, cultural, or
linguistic group, and which may be distinguished from the
numerical majority. 7 Even so, the international regime for
the protection of minorities has faced an arduous path
fraught with innumerable difficulties.8 Nevertheless, a body
of legal norms for the protection of minorities, many of
them anchored in the human rights corpus, has coalesced
over the last century. The highlight of these efforts was the
adoption in 1992 by the United Nations of a declaration on
the rights of minorities.9 In addition to basic human rights,
which are guaranteed to all individuals and groups,
international human rights law now requires that
minorities be treated in accordance with certain norms and
standards.
Although there is no formal definition in international
law of who constitutes a minority, there appears to be a
consensus that a "numerically smaller, non-dominant group
distinguished by shared ethnic, racial, religious, or
5. See Dana Priest & Mary Jordan, Iraq at Risk of Civil War, Top Generals
Tell Senators, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2006, at Al; Jim Rutenberg, 'Civil War' is
Uttered, and White House's Iraq Strategy is Dealt a Blow, WASH. POST, Aug. 6,
2006, at A4.
6. See PETER W. GALBRAITH, THE END OF IRAQ: How AMERICAN
INCOMPETENCE CREATED A WAR WITHOUT END (2006).
7. See Hurst Hannum, Contemporary Developments in the International
Protection of the Rights of Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1431 (1991).
8. See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A
NUTSHELL 10-14 (3d ed. 2002).
9. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, Annex, U.N. Doc
A/Res/47/135/Annex (Dec. 18, 1992) [hereinafter Declaration on the Rights of
Minorities].
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linguistic attributes" captures the meaning of the term. 10
Indeed, that is the definition implied by the Declaration on
the Rights of Minorities." In 1979, Francesco Capotorti,
who was the Special Rapporteur of the UN Sub-Commission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, formulated the most widely used definition of a
minority.
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a
State, in a non-dominant position, whose members-being
nationals of the state-possess ethnic, religious or linguistic
characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population
and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards
preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.12
Historically, the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia attempted
the first regime for the international protection of
minorities, even though parties to it only agreed to respect
the rights of certain, but not all, religious minorities. 13 But
it was not until after WWI, when the political maps of
Europe and the Middle East were substantially redrawn,
that in 1919 the League of Nations developed the first
modern regime for the protection of minorities. Thus a
number of new states, including Albania, Turkey, Austria,
Greece, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
Bulgaria, and Romania were required by the victors to sign
special treaties for the protection of the ethnic, linguistic,
and religious minorities within their borders. 14
Even though it was limited by time and place, the so-
called League of Nations minorities system established the
first effective set of norms, processes, and institutions for
the protection of minorities. The League Council and the
Permanent Court of International Justice combined to hear
10. Hannum, supra note 7, at 1431.
11. Declaration on the Rights of Minorities, supra note 9, at Art. 2.
12. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC] Sub-Comm. on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Study on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 96 U.N.
Doc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No.E.78. XIV.1 (1979) (prepared by
Francesco Capotorti) [hereinafter Capotorti].
13. See Hannum, supra note 7, at 1431.
14. See generally, HURST HANNUN, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-
DETERMINATION (1990).
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the petitions of minorities from which a body of law for
their protection took root.15 Jurisprudentially, the League's
system protected a wide array of minority rights, including
the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination; the
right to citizenship, with an option to retain a second
citizenship; the right to use the group's language; the right
to establish and control charitable, religious, and social
institutions; a duty on the state to support minority schools,
in which the medium of instruction was the minority
language; the primacy of laws protecting minorities over
ordinary statutes; and a limited degree of territorial
autonomy in some select cases. 16
There can be little doubt, however, that the League's
minorities system was an attempt by the victorious powers
to soothe and assuage minority groups whose claims for
self-determination--construed as the right to form their
own nation-states-were rejected. A number of problems
were obvious. For example, the treaties on minorities were
not applicable to the victors, nor was there any such
suggestion. Secondly, the treaties largely dealt with the
right to cultural survival: religion, language, and other
cultural matters. Except in several minor cases, the treaties
did not give minorities economic freedom or political power.
Thus minorities were largely confined to existing states in
which they were both politically and economically
dominated by majorities, and in essence were limited to a
second-class status.
Although the League's minorities system ultimately
failed and died with it, many of its norms were carried
forward in the human rights corpus created after WWII. It
is important to note, however, that the UN and other
international organs were, until the end of the Cold War,
more interested in protecting individual rights within the
framework of non-discrimination and equal protection than
in developing a specific regime for the protection of
minorities. But the end of the Cold War gave rise to
nationalism and sub-nationalism, shaking the foundations
15. See, e.g., Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 64, at 4 (Apr. 6); Access to German Minority Schools in Upper
Silesia, Advisory Opinion, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 40, at 4 (May 15).
16. See Inis L. Claude Jr., National Minorities: An International Problem
17-20 (1955); see also, Hannum, supra note 7, at 1432-33.
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of many states, and leading to the collapse and
disintegration of others. The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia,
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Somalia provided the
most poignant examples of the combustible mix of
nationalism, post-colonial trauma, ethnicity, race, religion,
language, and the persistent problem of minority rights.
Today, largely due to this tortured history, there is
recognition that the state must accord certain rights to
minorities. Contemporary minority rights jurisprudence is
drawn mostly from the norms of the League's system, the
UN Charter itself, the international human rights corpus,
and the Declaration on the Rights of Minorities. 17 As the
single most important site for the vindication of both
individual and group rights, the state, which is the obligor
of international norms, is required to provide for the
protection of minorities both in its basic and other laws.
Thus a state's constitution must, within the framework of
the bill of rights and other ordinary statutes, provide for the
norms, processes, and institutions for the protection of the
rights of minorities. To be sure, the scope and bases for
some of these rights are far from settled; but the bottom
line is not in dispute. In addition to equal protection and
non-discrimination in garden-variety bills of rights, certain
other rights and arrangements may be necessary for the
full protection of minorities. These include cultural survival
rights, although in certain cases the historical context may
require particular constitutional and political arrangements
to empower and protect minorities. These could be
autonomy regimes for minorities, federalism, or an option
for separation or secession.
This Essay contends that unless Iraq uses these
international norms to craft a rights regime that is
acceptable domestically and internationally to address the
rights and fears of minorities and vulnerable groups, the
country may fall apart. The Essay suggests several options
and devices, and outlines the floor below which both
international and human rights law will not permit a state
to fall. It argues that flexibility in contemplating various
options is particularly essential in post-conflict societies
17. See also the European Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities, opened for signature, Feb. 1, 1995, Europ. T.S. No. 157,
which further codifies the rights of minorities.
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where groups are deeply divided by chasms of race, religion,
history, region, ethnicity, and the asymmetries of political
power and control over economic resources. In the
particular case of Iraq, there are schisms on at least three
different levels. The first is ethnic, with the Arab
population estimated at 75%, the Kurds at 15-20%, and the
smaller groups of Assyrians, Turkmens, Armenians, and
others at 5%.i8 The second divide is religious: 96% of all
Iraqis are Muslims, and of those, 60% are Shia, and 40%
are Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurds. Christians make up
most of the rest of the population. 19 The third faultline is
regional: the Shia live largely in the central and southern
region, the Sunni in the north, and the Kurds in the
northern highlands. 20
The differences among the various Iraqi groups were
exacerbated by decades of violent repression under former
President Saddam Hussein who was deposed by the U.S.
invasion in 2003. But the U.S. invasion has spawned untold
violence and pushed Iraq to the edge of collapse. In addition
to its wanton destruction of life, limb, and property, the
occupation has engendered a civil war among the three
major identities, the Shia, the Sunni, and the Kurds, that
now threatens the survival of the state.2 1 These cataclysmic
chasms can only be addressed in the context of the
reconstruction and reconstitution of Iraq. But to be credible,
stable, and legitimate, any post-Hussein, post-occupation
state must deal fairly and intelligently with the competing
claims, fears, and aspirations of the Shia, the Sunni, and
the Kurds. In other words, any credible solution must
accommodate the anxieties of Iraqi minorities.
I. MINORITY RIGHTS: THE BASIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Contemporary international human rights law, which
forms the basis for the protection of the rights of minorities,
is a post-WWII phenomenon. In fact, human rights law
18. Encarta Encyclopedia, http://Encarta.msn.com/text_761567303_0/Iraq.
html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Nicholas Sambanis, It's Official: There is Now a Civil War in Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2006, § 4, at 13.
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rises from the ashes of the Holocaust, the attempt by the
Third Reich to completely eradicate Jews, a European
minority, from the face of the earth. The UN Charter itself
proclaimed, in part, that one of its "purposes" was to
promote and encourage "respect . . . for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion. ' 22 These obligations are further spelt
out in Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter. The
importance that the UN Charter places on equal protection
and non-discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, and
language, three of the most important identities that have
historically been the pretext for the repression of
minorities, cannot be overstated. While it is true that the
UN Charter does not even once mention the rights of
minorities, it would be incorrect to argue that the drafters
were oblivious to the problem. In 1947, the UN established
the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, known by that name until 1999
when it became the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights. In 1978, the UN Commission
on Human Rights [Human Rights Council] 23 established the
open-ended Working Group on Minorities, the body that
drafted the 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Minorities. 24
The Declaration drew on Capotorti's 1979 report, the
leading study on the treatment of minorities. 25
The UN, unlike the League of Nations, was not
preoccupied with minority rights. Instead, the UN seemed
to think that the problem of minorities could be resolved if
their individual rights to equality and non-discrimination
were guaranteed, along with those of individuals in the
majority groups. But this individualization of the rights of
minorities, ostensibly denying them of their group or
collective character, was clearly a mistake. In addition, the
UN Charter's language of the "principle of equal rights and
22. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
23. On March 15, 2006, the United Nations General Assembly transformed
the UN Commission on Human Rights into the Human Rights Council through
General Assembly resolution A/Res/60/251. See Amnesty International, "UN
Human Rights Council: A New Beginning for Human Rights," AI Index:
IOR40/017/2006 (Public), May 10, 2006.
24. UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 116-17
(1984).
25. Capotorti, supra note 12.
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self-determination of peoples '26 was initially restricted to
the right of the peoples under colonialism to their own
independent sovereign state. But this restriction only
contemplated separation from the colonial power, and not a
solution to the problem of minorities within the newly
independent states. Nevertheless, it became in the post-
Cold War period a basis for imagining more robust claims
by minorities and other peoples. 27
Not surprisingly, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, arguably the single most important human rights
document, did not specifically address minority rights
either, choosing instead to underscore the respect for
individual rights through the principles of equal protection
and non-discrimination without regard to "race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status. ' '28 Again, it is
important to note that many of these distinctions have been
the basis for abominations against minorities. In 1960, the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization [UNESCO], adopted the Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, which recognized the right of
minority groups to carry out their own educational
activities, establish their own schools, and instruct students
in their own language. 29
It was not until 1966 that the human rights corpus
directly addressed the rights of minorities through the
adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights [ICCPR], easily the most important general
scope human rights treaty.30 Article 26 of the ICCPR, in its
equal protection clause, prohibits discrimination on various
grounds, including race, sex, language, religion, and
26. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.
27. See Richard A. Falk, The Right of Self-Determination Under
International Law: The Coherence of Doctrine Versus the Incoherence of
Experience, in SELF-DETERMINATION AND SELF-ADMINISTRATION 47, 55-56
(Wolfgang Danspeckgruber & Arthur Watts eds., 1997).
28. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 2,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
29. See Convention Against Discrimination in Education, art. 5, Dec. 14,
1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93.
30. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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national origin. In a provision that has been celebrated as
the first explicit recognition of the rights of minorities in a
human rights treaty, the ICCPR provides that, "[i]n those
states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be
denied the right, in community with other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice
their own religion, or to use their own language."31
Noteworthy here is the fact that the ICCPR only
recognizes a very narrow and traditional range of minority
rights, those relating to culture, religion, and language,
without imagining others. 32 Perhaps more disturbing is the
fact that the rights are granted to individual members of
the group, and do not explicitly attach to the group itself,
which signifies a reluctance to recognize the groups in their
collective identity. However, it is not possible to enjoy
cultural or linguistic rights as an atomistic individual. Thus
Article 27 of the ICCPR should really be read to imply
group rights as well, and therefore a tacit recognition of the
corporate rights of minority groups.3 3 In 1994, the Human
Rights Committee, the ICCPR's treaty body, issued General
Comment 23 on Article 27 of the ICCPR.34
General Comment 23 was at pains to assure states that
Article 27 did not envision the grant to minorities the right
of self-determination-defined as secession or separation-
from an existing state. In that sense, it sought to reaffirm
the traditional reading of common Article 1 of the ICCPR
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights which states, in part, that "[a]ll peoples
31. ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 27.
32. See Louis B. Sohn, The Rights of Minorities, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL
OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 270, 270-87 (Louis
Henkin ed., 1981).
33. See Henry J. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle Over
Autonomy Regimes for Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539, 1546-47 (1991).
34. The General Comment is the authoritative jurisprudential
interpretation of the ICCPR, and clarifies and expounds the meaning of the
treaty, although the quality of general comments has been uneven. See DOMINIC
MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 94 (1991).
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have the right of self-determination. ' 35 That provision has
not been construed to grant minorities an open-ended right
of secession. General Comment 23 explained that the
enjoyment of rights under Article 27 "does not prejudice the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of a State party. ' 36 But
the Human Rights Committee stressed that although the
rights protected under Article 27 were individual, they
"depend... on the ability of the minority group to maintain
its culture. ' 37 The Human Rights Committee here is
treading carefully between the traditional conception of the
right to self-determination, which excluded minority
groups, and contemporary pressures to more fully recognize
the rights of minorities.
Several other regional and universal human rights
documents continue the theme of equal protection and anti-
discrimination. In 1990, the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe affirmed minority rights in the areas
of language, education, and political participation in the
Copenhagen principles. 38 The Council of Europe undertook
similar commitments in the 1995 Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities. 39  The
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) outlaws racial
discrimination which it defines as "any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour,
descent, or national or ethnic origin" which impairs the
enjoyment of the entire gamut of human rights.40 The 1981
UN anti-discrimination declaration on religion or belief also
made a useful contribution to minority rights
35. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200, Annex, art. 1, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
36. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 23: The rights of
minorities (Art. 27), 3.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (Aug. 4, 1994).
37. Id. 6.2.
38. See Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the
Human Dimension of the CSCE, June 29, 1990, 11 HUM. RTS. L.J. 232 (1990).
39. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, opened
for signature Feb. 1, 1995, Europ. T.S. No. 157.
40. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, art. 1, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5
I.L.M. 352 [hereinafter CERD].
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jurisprudence. 41 Finally, of course, the UN adopted the
Declaration on the Rights of Minorities in 1992. Although
not formally binding, the Declaration on Minorities restates
long held principles and standards on the rights of
minorities. Several of its norms have entered into the
general corpus of international law as opinio juris.
Note should be taken of the fact that the Declaration on
Minorities neither uses the terms "peoples," nor "self-
determination," nor "autonomy." It states "[n]othing in [it]
may be construed as permitting any activity contrary to...
sovereign equality, territorial integrity and the political
independence of States."42 Again, this is a reaffirmation of
the traditional understanding of the right to self-
determination, and a rejection of the construction of that
right as entitling minority groups the right to secession.
But the Declaration also gives "[p]ersons belonging to
minorities the right to participate effectively in cultural,
religious, social, economic and public life."43 It guarantees
individual members of minority groups the right "to
participate effectively" in national and regional decisions
concerning them. 44 But the Declaration does not define the
term "minority" and generally protects individual, not
group rights. By restating internationally acceptable
standards, the Declaration essentially establishes the floor
below which states cannot fall in their treatment of
minorities. Suffice it to note that the Working Group on
Minorities continued to report on problems faced by
minorities and to further elaborate on their rights.45
It is not possible to discuss the rights of minorities
without any reference to the rights of indigenous peoples, a
category of peoples whose issues are analogous to those of
minorities. Although many indigenous peoples also tend to
41. See Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th
Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55 (Nov. 25, 1981).
42. Declaration on the Rights of Minorities, supra note 9, art. 8(4).
43. Id. art. 2(2).
44. Id. art. 2(3).
45. See, e.g., Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion &
Prot. of Human Rights, Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities: Report of the Working Group of Minorities on its Tenth Session, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/29 (June 8, 2004).
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be minorities, they have pressed for, and been accorded, a
separate regulatory regime under international law. Thus,
the two categories have different standard setting
processes. While the Declaration on the Rights of Minorities
governs in one case, two International Labor Organization
(ILO) conventions 46 and the Draft Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples are regarded as the most important
documents on indigenous peoples. 47 The Draft Declaration,
which is still under discussion at the UN Human Rights
Council, controversially provides that "[i]ndigenous peoples
have the right of self-determination" by which "they freely
determine their political status."48 This is a paradigmatic
departure from the timidity of the Declaration on the
Rights of Minorities, and one of the reasons why states are
unlikely to approve the Draft Declaration in its current
formulation. 49 Nevertheless, debates on the rights of
indigenous peoples, especially their insistence on the right
of self-determination, have forced states and international
law to evolve towards a somewhat less negative view. 50 This
development in international law can only benefit
minorities because of the analogy between the two
categories of peoples.
In sum, this basic legal framework for the protection of
minorities should provide a basic signpost for virtually all
states, including Iraq, in their treatment of minorities.
Several of the norms governing the protection of minorities
are either part of customary international law, human
rights, or both. It is incumbent on each state therefore to
formulate domestic legal regimes to vindicate these norms.
The scope of the norms, and the manner and extent of their
guarantee, will depend on historical and contextual
46. Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, ILO 107, which was
revised by the Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries, ILO 169, 72 ILO OFFICIAL BULL. 59, entered into
force September 5, 1991.
47. Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion & Prot. of
Human Rights, Technical review of the United Nations draft declaration on the
rights of indigenous peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (Apr. 20,
1994).
48. Id. art. 3.
49. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 1302 (2d ed. 2000).
50. See Falk, supra note 26, at 61.
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circumstances in each country. How deeply and robust a
state entrenches the protection of the right of minorities
will depend on many factors, including the size of the
minority population, its historical relationship with the
state and the majority, and the stability of the state. A
number of options are possible, including the traditionalist
approach in which minority rights are protected through
the generic bill of rights in the constitution, the creation of
a federal state, the formulation of various autonomy
regimes, or the eventual separation or secession and the
establishment of an independent sovereign state for the
minority population. What is clear is that states cannot
simply ignore the rights of minorities, or worse still, violate
them with impunity.
Iraq is today a deeply divided and violent society.
Unfortunately, these gaping cleavages are ethnic, religious,
cultural, and linguistic. Sunni Arabs, a minority that had
long dominated the Iraqi state to the exclusion of the Shia
and the Kurds until the American invasion in 2003, are at
risk of being relegated to the status of the traditional
minority, one without political power and adequate
representation in the post-occupation state. This was
precisely the outcome of the national elections held on
December 15, 2005 under which Iraqis voted for a full-term
government. 51 Predictably, the majority of the seats went to
the Shia, an Arab religious majority that has historically
been repressed and marginalized by the Sunni. 52 Out of a
total of 275 seats in the legislature, the Shia received 140,
or more than half, the Kurds seventy five, and the Sunni
most of the rest. 53 The legislature was charged with the
responsibility of drafting Iraq's permanent constitution. But
neither the election nor the constitution did anything to end
violence.
The matrix of Iraqi minority populations makes
political democracy, and the resultant Shia domination,
both a blessing and a curse. The Kurds, long autonomous
even under the reign of Saddam Hussein, are not anxious
51. See Robert F. Worth, Top Coalitions Fall Just Short in Iraq Voting, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2006, at Al.
52. See John F. Burns & James Glanz, Iraqi Shiites Win, But Margin is Less
than Projection, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2005, at Al.
53. See id.
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for Shia domination, or their forced inclusion and
participation in a violent Iraqi state. As such, the Kurds, a
non-Arab minority, may opt for separation in the event of a
deepening civil war, or a suffocating domination of the state
by the Shia. Unfortunately, the permanent constitution did
not adequately address the anxieties of the Sunnis and the
Kurds, let alone those of the Christian, Assyrian, Turkmen,
Armenian, and other minorities. That is why the legislature
must utilize every tool in the box of options to draft a
constitutional and legal dispensation that protects the
rights of all and reconstructs a viable state.
II. THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A MINIMALIST APPROACH
The liberal constitution, the fundamental document for
a modern political democracy, is now viewed as the best
vehicle for protecting individual rights. 54
A political democracy built on the protections of the
liberal constitution is the best guarantee for the enjoyment
of a wide gamut of human rights.55 Liberal theory is
premised on the liberty and rights of the individual on
whose consent the legitimacy of the state is founded. The
human rights regime is rooted in liberal theory. Thus, for
example, Article 21 of the UDHR provides that the "will of
the people shall be the basis of the authority of
government"56 and Article 25 of the ICCPR states that only
"genuine periodic elections" can guarantee the "free
expression of the will of the electors." 57 Among other things,
both liberal theory and human rights are attentive to the
proclivity of the state to abuse the individual, hence the
formulation of norms and a state typology that limit the
reach of state power. In effect, therefore, the rights
language acts as a guarantee against state despotism.
This skepticism of state power is contained in a genus
of constitutional system known as constitutionalism.
54. See generally, VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999).
55. See Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'L L.
589 (1996); Henry J. Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1 HARv.
HUM. RTS. Y.B. 77 (1988).
56. UDHR, supra note 27, art. 21.
57. ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 25.
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Constitutionalism is a reference to several essential
features of a democratic constitution, the foundation for a
political democracy. The constitution is based on the
concept of popular sovereignty. The essential features are:
accountability of the state to the people through a number
of techniques and mechanisms, the most important of which
is periodic, regular, and genuine elections in a multiparty
system; a scheme of checks and balances, usually through
the separation of powers; an independent judiciary that is
the guardian of the rule of law; and a guarantee of
individual rights, normally in the Bill of Rights.58 These
features, which were first developed in Western Europe and
the United States, are now increasingly common in African,
Asian, and Latin American countries. The adoption of the
liberal constitution accelerated rapidly after the Cold War
in the former Soviet Bloc and the previously one-party
states and military dictatorships in Africa.
Perhaps no other basic law more elaborately provides
for the Bill of Rights than the 1996 South Africa post-
Apartheid constitution, which is now regarded as a model
document. 59 In it, the Bill of Rights guarantees protections
from the state which are non-derogable,6 0 and which the
majority populations cannot easily abrogate. 61 The Bill of
Rights is therefore an anti-democratic device in the sense
that it limits and may even prohibit majorities from
altering it to the detriment of individual rights.6 2 In its
equal protection clause, the South African Constitution
provides that the state may not "unfairly discriminate"
against anyone on the basis of race, color, religion, culture,
language, or ethnic or social origin, among others.6 3 But it
permits the passage of legislation and the adoption of other
measures "to protect or advance persons, or categories of
58. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 48, at 990.
59. S. AFR. CONST.
60. See id. § 37.
61. See id. Ch. 2.
62. The South African Constitution provides that the Bill of Rights can only
be amended by a combination of two-thirds of the members of the National
Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, with at least 6 provinces,
which is two-thirds of the provinces. See id. § 74(2).
63. See id. § 9(3).
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persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. ' 64 Human
rights law authorizes this nod to affirmative action and
other measures to alleviate the historical legacy of
discrimination, exclusion, or marginalization. 65 In other
words, the state may discriminate with reason. It is
important to note that the Bill of Rights here binds all
branches of the state, including the legislature, the
executive, and the judiciary, and may be applicable to both
natural and juristic persons.66
The South African Bill of Rights, like all others, is
largely a manifesto for the protection of individual, and not
group, rights. In that sense, it grants fundamental rights to
individuals on the assumption that the rights of all,
whether individuals or groups, can be protected through a
regime of equal protection and anti-discrimination. This is
the same logic that directs the international regime for the
protection of groups and minorities. Even so, the South
African Bill of Rights explicitly protects the right of
individuals to "use the language and to participate in the
cultural life of their choice. ' 67 In fact, the constitution
recognizes the seven major African languages, in addition
to English and Afrikaans. 68 More importantly, the Bill of
Rights protects the cultural, religious, and linguistic rights
of "persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic
community" to enjoy these rights "with other members of
that community." 69 Clearly, this provision was meant to
protect the rights of the formerly dominant white-Boer
and English-minorities after the investiture of a
democracy under Black majority rule. But it is, of course,
applicable to other minority groups, most of them African.
Although South Africa was a deeply divided society,
particularly along racial lines, it chose a unitary state
without any special arrangements for the protection of
64. Id. § 9(2).
65. See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46 at
194, U.N. Doc. A/34/830 (Dec. 21 1979) [hereinafter CEDAW]; CERD, supra
note 39, art. 1(4).
66. See S. AFR. CONST. § 8(l)-(2).
67. Id. § 30.
68. See id. § 6(1).
69. Id. § 31.
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minorities in its constitutional framework. Nor did it
recognize group rights as such, opting instead to vest rights
in individuals within groups and communities. Therefore,
minority groups do not enjoy an explicit legal status in
South Africa. However, there is some recognition for
traditional authorities and leaders in the constitution. Such
leaders, understood as customary law heads of some
African ethnic groups, are allowed to function subject to the
constitution and the Bill of Rights. 70 As such, traditional
authorities can only apply African customary laws to the
extent that they are not inconsistent with the Bill of Rights
or the Constitution. The South African approach to the
protection of groups is oblique in the sense that their rights
are only impliedly recognized in their individual members.
The 2005 Iraqi Constitution provides a wide array of
both civil and political rights, as well as economic, social,
and cultural liberties. 71 However, many of these are limited
by claw back clauses, or exceptions that permit derogation.
Nor does the constitution use the term "bill of rights" to
describe these rights, or grant them a special legal status in
the document. It is true, however, that it provides for a
generic equal protection clause for all irrespective of gender,
race, ethnicity, origin, color, religion, creed, belief or
opinion, or economic and social status.72 Thus all groups,
particularly the minorities-Sunni, Kurds, Christians, and
other smaller groups-must be guaranteed equal protection
under the law in which all discrimination is outlawed. But
these rights should have been insulated from the whims of
the majority by setting a virtually impossible threshold for
constitutional amendments. For example, amendments to
the constitution and basic rights should require not only a
super-majority, but also approval by the major
administrative units, including the minority groups. But in
addition to equal protection and anti-discrimination
requirements, a proper Bill of Rights must guarantee to
minority groups, such as the Assyrians, Christians, and
Armenians, the right to use their own language, the right to
practice their own religion, and the right to enjoy their
culture. The state should support, or at least not hinder or
70. See id. ch. 12.
71. See IRAQ CONST. ch. 2.
72. See id. art. 14.
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prohibit, the efforts of minority groups to establish
educational institutions in which their languages are the
primary media for instruction.
The new Iraqi Constitution should have been a secular
document in which there is separation of state and religion.
However, it provided that "Islam is the official religion of
the state" and a "basic source of legislation."73 This
formulation establishes Islam, or a particular sect of it, over
other faiths. It is also inconsistent with equal protection
notions, and may even favor Shia Islam over others. State
favoritism or establishment of one faith over another, or
any other formal or quasi-formal domination of the state by
one faith, can be the basis for the intolerance of difference.
State and constitutional structures that either resemble or
institute a theocracy substantially negate if not nullify a
bill of rights in Iraq. An Iran-style Shia state, in which
Islamic clerics wield influence over the state, is inconsistent
with the protection of minorities. Even the domination of an
ostensibly secular Iraqi state by Shia religious political
parties would have compromised equal protection norms.
Thus, every effort must be made to work for the separation
of religion from the state, and to diminish both the formal
and informal influence of the mullahs in the state and its
institutions.
III. AUTONOMY REGIMES FOR MINORITIES
Autonomy regimes may be the best solution for
countries with strong willed and historically antagonistic
groups. Within such schemes minority groups are able to
defend, advance, and enjoy their basic rights as a collective
or group entity. As such, the cultural survival of the group,
which may not otherwise be guaranteed in a state
dominated by a majority group, can be assured. It is
important to note, however, that neither the international
law regime on minorities nor the human rights corpus
directly and explicitly authorize autonomy regimes.
However, one can argue that both regimes of law imply
some autonomy regimes for minorities.
73. Id. art. 2.
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Articles 1, 25, and 27 of the ICCPR74 provide the best
case for an argument of autonomy regimes for minorities.
Similarly, Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Declaration on the
Rights of Minorities could be interpreted to support
autonomy regimes.75 Although Article 1 of the ICCPR on
self-determination has generally been applied to
decolonization, the right of a people to be free from external
domination, it could also be read to support internal self-
determination under which a minority group could base a
claim for some autonomy. Article 25 of the ICCPR, which
gives citizens the right to political participation, could
likewise be used to support autonomy by exposing the
deficits of winner-take-all majoritarian democracies which
either marginalize minorities or deny them political power
and any effective leverage over the political process. Article
2(3) of the Declaration on the Rights Minorities also
stresses their "right to participate effectively" in national
decisions. 76 Finally, Article 27 of the ICCPR grants
individuals of minority groups the right to "enjoy their own
culture, ... profess and practice ... their religion, or to use
their own language," 77 which is echoed by Article 2(1) of the
Declaration on the Rights of Minorities. In certain cases,
only an autonomy regime could assure the group and its
culture's survival. 78
These arguments, which imagine three types of
autonomy schemes for minorities, should be attractive to
Iraqi legislators as they reform the country and tweak the
new Iraqi constitution because autonomy regimes could
substantially defuse group tensions, especially from the
viewpoint of minorities. The first autonomy regime involves
various power-sharing arrangements between minority
groups and dominant majorities. In the case of Iraq, such
arrangements would at least include the most important
minority groups such as Sunni, Kurds, Christians,
Turkmen, Assyrians, Armenians, and maybe others, in
power-sharing arrangements with the Shia. Here, minority
groups within the state would be identified either by
74. ICCPR, supra note 29, arts. 1, 25, 27.
75. Declaration on the Rights of Minorities, supra note 9, arts. 2-4.
76. Id. art. 2(3).
77. ICCPR, supra note 29, art. 27.
78. See Steiner, supra note 32, at 1546-47.
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ethnicity, religion, or language. Through some statistical
matrix, the minority groups would then be entitled to
participate in the political, social, and economic life of the
state. For example, the Kurds could be constitutionally
entitled to elect a certain percentage of the members of the
national legislature from a list that is internal to them and
which would not be open to competition from other groups.
Perhaps the minority legislators could be entitled to vote as
a bloc on certain measures. Minority groups could hold a
veto over an amendment to constitutional provisions on
basic rights, the constitution, or ordinary laws, particularly
in matters that may affect their status. Or a certain
percentage of the civil service jobs could be reserved for the
members of minority groups such as the Sunni, Kurds,
Christians, and others. Maybe certain ministerial positions
and slots in the judiciary could be earmarked for certain
minorities. 79 How resources are shared could also be
problematic. The Iraqi Constitution gives the Shiite and
Kurdish regions more allotments of oil revenues because
they were "unjustly deprived by the former regime. °80 This
could inflame Sunnis and arrest any attempts at national
reconstruction. But specially targeted constitutional
arrangements could empower minorities, give them a
meaningful voice in the state, and ensure their preservation
as a group. Belgium and Lebanon offer two tales of both the
success, and difficulty, of such power-sharing arrangements
between groups.
Another autonomy regime for minorities that Iraq
should consider involves the devolution of powers from the
central government to a given territory of the country in
which the minority group predominantly resides.8 1 The
2005 Iraq Constitution provides for a federal structure in
which the central government relinquishes control over
certain matters to a given regional territorial structures
dominated by specific minority groups.8 2 But the scheme,
which was hotly contested, was left intentionally vague.
The national legislature is supposed to define the division of
powers between the central government and the regions. An
79. See id. at 1541-42.
80. IRAQ CONST. art. 109.
81. Steiner, supra note 32, at 1542.
82. See IRAQ CONST. arts. 106-122.
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autonomy that devolves powers from the center may not
necessarily contemplate a federal structure, but a unitary
state in which the devolved units exercise some power over
a limited range of matters, but are still largely subject to
the center. However, a federal structure, such as that of
Quebec in Canada or Catalonia in Spain, would give
substantial powers to the minority group. Depending on
negotiations between minorities and the dominant group,
the federal units could establish regional governments, a
local police force, manage their schools and natural
resources, and other internal matters. The federal
government would carve for itself exclusive jurisdiction over
foreign affairs, the armed forces, and national finances,
among others. In Iraq, the most likely candidates for either
devolution or federalism are the Sunni who reside in the
north, and the Kurds in the northern highlands. Effectively,
the Kurds already enjoy an autonomy regime in the
highlands far from the reach of the central government in
Baghdad. Interestingly, the Shia have also advocated for a
federal state, seeing in it an opportunity for them to
exercise more control over the vast deposits of oil in the
south where most of them live. The Kurds are unlikely to
accept any arrangement that diminishes their autonomy.
The final autonomy regime relevant for Iraq would be
to permit a minority group to be governed by a law specific
to it. s 3 These include personal family laws that the
constitution already permits. 84 Such personal laws are
usually religious and pertain to family matters. Applied by
religious courts or courts based on religious jurisprudence,
personal laws may provide the minority group substantial
autonomy in matters that are internal to the group without
disturbing the balance of power in the state. Perhaps the
most famous example of such a regime is the case of
Muslims in India. But personal laws, particularly those
based on religion, could permit a minority to oppress its
members from within. Since many personal laws address
family law matters, more often than not they tend to
oppress women and entrench the patriarchy with the
protection of the state. To cure this problem, such laws
would have to be subject to equal protection clauses or a
83. Steiner, supra note 32, at 1542.
84. See IRAQ CONST. art. 39.
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Bill of Rights in the constitution. Unfortunately, the Iraqi
constitution is extremely vague on how these are to be
applied and regulated. In Iraq, this regime may be most
relevant to Sunnis, Kurds, and non-Muslim minority groups
such as Christians.
But autonomy regimes for minorities must be viewed
with a caveat. The purpose of the protection of minorities is
both to ensure their survival and to enrich the entire body
politic. Respect for difference, contact with otherness, and
openness are central themes in the human rights corpus.
Autonomy regimes therefore cannot erect barriers against
outsiders, or seal off all exits to forcibly deny its members
the opportunity to opt out. Nor should they establish
systems of tyranny against even smaller minorities among
them. For example, a Sunni or Kurdish autonomous region
cannot be permitted to discriminate against the Shia,
Christians, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Turkmen, and others
among them. Such illiberal, autocratic, and exclusivist
practices would frustrate the norms of the human rights
movement and render indefensible the logic of the
autonomy regime itself. These are complex and problematic
questions that must be addressed in crafting autonomy
regimes for Iraqi minorities.
Autonomy regimes permit antagonistic groups,
particularly where the minorities are deeply aggrieved, the
chance to peacefully co-exist within the state. They ensure
the cultural survival of the minority as a group and may
give them an effective voice within the state, lifting them
from the shadows of the society. But a constitution-making
process need not be limited to only one autonomy regime. In
the case of Iraq, it may be necessary to cobble together
different autonomy regimes for different minority groups.
For example, while personal laws may be relevant to one
group, power-sharing arrangements might make more
sense for another. Still, a federal structure might be most
appropriate for yet another minority. A combination of
different autonomy regimes for different minority groups
may be the best solution to a complex situation. But
autonomy regimes are not a panacea for all situations. Note
should be taken of Cyprus where the failure of co-existence
between groups has demonstrated the limitations, if not the
futility, of autonomy regimes.
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IV. SELF-DETERMINATION: SECESSION OR SEPARATION
The most controversial and problematic question for the
international law regime on minorities is whether minority
groups have any legal basis to claim a right to self-
determination understood as separation or secession from
an independent, sovereign state. The crux of this debate is
whether minorities can be regarded as "peoples" in the
language of the UN Charter, a construction that would
permit them to exercise the right of self-determination. The
matter is most urgent in states where co-existence between
groups seems either impossible or fraught with extreme
difficulties. Consider, for example the ethnic, religious, and
racial conflicts in Sri Lanka, India, the former Yugoslavia,
Tibet in China, Rwanda and Burundi, Nigeria, Northern
Ireland and the United Kingdom, Israel and Palestine,
Chechnya, Kashmir, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Black Africans
in Sudan, and many others. As correctly stated by Henry
Steiner, "[m]any of those conflicts have an ethnic character,
involving minorities and indigenous peoples. Many raise an
urgent and ultimate question about the principle of self-
determination: if, and if so under what conditions, it
legitimates secession and the creation of a new state or
adherence to an existing one. '8 5
One basic problem is the convoluted history of the
doctrine of self-determination and its application. Early in
the life of international law, the principle of self-
determination applied only to select European powers that
regarded themselves as "civilized nations."8 6 At the Treaty
of Versailles after WWI, the victorious powers again
redefined the principle of self-determination and redrew the
map of Europe largely along national lines, creating more
nation-states. But the principle was not fully universalized.
It left out some European groups and certainly was not
applicable to the colonies and the dependent territories in
Africa, the Middle East, Asia, the Caribbean, and the
Pacific. After WWII, decolonization movements again
deployed the principle of self-determination to coalesce a
85. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 48, at 1249; see also BEREKET H.
SELLASIE, THE MAKING OF THE ERITREAN CONSTITUTION: THE DIALECTIC OF
PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE (2003).
86. Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International Responses to
Ethno-Separatist Claims, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 28 (1998).
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right by colonial territories to break away from the colonial,
metropolitan European powers and form their own
independent sovereign states.8 7
The extension of the principle of self-determination to
colonial territories did not, however, apply to individual
groups within those territories, but rather to the territory
itself8 8 Put differently, international law did not extend the
right of self-determination to different "peoples" within the
former colonies, but rather to entire "peoples" in the
territory as a single entity. In fact, newly independent
African states quickly adopted the principle of uti
possidetis, developed first in post-colonial Latin America, to
sanctify the inviolability of the colonial borders.8 9 The 1963
Charter of the Organization of African Unity validated the
colonial state as the basic unit for self-determination. 90
States in Asia, the Middle East, and in other regions of the
world adopted the same rigid view of the principle of self-
determination. Clearly, this was a rejection by states of the
secessionist proclivities of national sub-groups within their
borders. But did this rejection amount to opinio juris, a
customary rule of international law, or are there
circumstances under which secession and separation of
national sub-groups is permitted?
Scholars are divided on whether, and if so, under what
circumstances, national sub-groups, including minorities
and indigenous peoples, can exercise the right to self-
determination, understood as secession, from existing
sovereign states. The practice, however, would seem to
point to the existence of a limited right of secession under
certain circumstances. Even Justice Higgins of the
International Court of Justice who reads the right to self-
87. See, e.g., Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 121, U.N. GAOR, 25th
Sess., 1883th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/8082 (Oct. 24 1970).
88. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), at 66, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., 947th plen. mtg.,
(Dec. 14, 1960).
89. See generally Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral
and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113 (1995).
90. See Orentlicher, supra note 83, passim.
91. See Charter of the Organization of African Unity, arts. I-II, May 25,
1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39.
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determination more strictly than most jurists, reluctantly
concedes that there could be some exceptions. But she
rejects the notion that the right of self-determination
belongs to all national or sub-national groups. She argues
that the right to self-determination, as used in Article 1 of
the UN Charter, should properly be understood to apply
only to "peoples" and not minorities. 91 According to her,
minorities are not "peoples" in the language of the UN
Charter. Higgins contends that minorities possess only
"minority rights" that are granted under Article 27 of the
ICCPR. 92 She asserts that Quebec, for example, has no
right to secede from Canada on the ground that it is a
linguistic minority. But she concedes that there is what she
calls a "perceived need [to secede]" where minority rights
are suppressed. She argues that:
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had no automatic legal right to
secede by [the] the invocation of a right [to self-determination] of
ethnic or religious groups who formed a minority in the larger
federal state of Yugoslavia. The perceived need of secession is
understandable when minorities are denied their right as
minorities or where they cannot participate, as part of the entire
peoples of a country, in the political and economic life of the
country.9 3
Higgins is driven partly by the liberal project of
diversity, pluralism, multinationalism, and tolerance in her
rejection of what she calls illiberal "uninational and
unicultural states that constitutes postmodern tribalism."94
To be sure, an open-ended right to self-determination could
be problematic. One could imagine the explosion of mini
tribal states, or nation-states in embryo, with no real
chance of viability. But such a suggestion demagogues
genuine cases that should be recognized. Situations of
extreme exploitation and repression come to mind. It would
be unconscionable to deny minority groups the right to
secede where they were subject to genocidal or racist
majorities and where the state was so repressive that there
92. R. Higgins, Comments, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 29, 32 (Catherine Brolmann, Ren6 Lefeber & Marjorleine Zieck eds., 1993).
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 33.
95. Id. at 35.
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was no possibility of freedom or respect for human rights.
The cases of Black Africans in the south of Sudan, or its
Darfur region in the west, most poignantly come to mind.
Alan Buchanan has identified three bases under which the
right to secession should be allowed as a remedy of last
resort. These are: persistent and serious violations of
human rights; historically unjust and unaddressed seizures
of territory, like annexation; and discriminatory
redistribution through internal colonialism or regional
exploitation. 95
In spite of the views of some traditional jurists,
international law now treats sub-national groups, including
minorities or indigenous populations, as "peoples." The
Supreme Court of Canada declared in the 1998 Quebec
secession case that "[i]t is clear that a 'people' may include
only a portion of the population of an existing state" who
could exercise the right to self-determination. 96 The opinion
suggests that minorities can secede as a last resort if the
government does not represent all the people on the basis of
equality and non-discrimination. 97 Thus "when a people is
blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-
determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to
exercise it by secession. 98 It seems clear that under
international law minorities have no -right to secede in
political democracies that respect basic human rights and
in which minority rights are guaranteed. However, that
right may be granted in situations of extreme
marginalization, exploitation, and abuse.
Arguably, only two Iraqi groups could contemplate
secession if a Shia-dominated state became abusive,
dictatorial, and denied them an effective voice in the
governance and the administration of the state. Unlike the
Kurds, the Sunnis may not be anxious to secede because
they inhabit areas that are not endowed with oil, the
country's principal resource. Even so, the Sunnis and the
96. See Allen Buchanan, Self-Determination, Secession, and the Rule of Law,
in THE MORALITY OF NATIONALISM 301, 310 (Robert McKim & Jeff McMahan
eds., 1997).
97. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. 217, 124.
98. See id. 130.
99. Id. 134; see also Abdullahi A. An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng, Self-
Determination and Unity: The Case of Sudan, 18 LAw & POL'Y 199, 205 (1996).
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Kurds could exit the state unless the new constitutional
framework adequately addresses and secures the rights of
minorities and gives them a meaningful role in the state. It
is important that equal protection and anti-discrimination
norms, including the internationally recognized rights of
minorities within states, be an integral part of the
developing constitutional framework in Iraq. Otherwise, the
Kurds and the Sunnis could secede, leaving the
international community with little choice but to ratify the
secession.
V. GENDER AND MINORITY RIGHTS
It is beyond the scope of this Essay to fully address the
rights of women in the new Iraqi constitution. However, the
protection of the rights of minorities raises complex
questions about various sub-groups within them. More
often than not, minority girls and women are violated at
multiple levels as members of a minority, as women, and by
the patriarchy within the minority. Regimes for the
protection of minority groups from the majority cannot be a
license for the minority to violate the basic human rights of
some of its members. In other words, the cultural survival
of a minority group, which is essential to its continuity,
cannot be achieved at the expense of a sub-category of the
group. The right to internal self-determination, which is the
basis for the regimes for the protection of minorities, must
also be the basis for the guarantee of equal protection and
anti-discrimination norms within the group. Thus the
group's practices and institutions cannot operate outside
the ambit of the Bill of Rights and human rights norms.
This may particularly be a problem where autonomy
regimes for minorities are established. Such regimes, be
they power-sharing arrangements, personal laws, or
devolved or federal units, give minority groups substantial
power. Minority groups could wield executive power within
their regions, preside over their own courts in family law
matters, or elect a protected bloc to the national legislature.
This is where the patriarchy and religions could collude to
discriminate against girls and women, to exclude and
repress them. Practices that would offend human rights
law, particularly CEDAW, the women's convention, include
the denial of the right to political participation, equality
before the law, segregation of women and girls, physical
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abuse of women, including marital rape, restrictions on
access to public life, and social and educational services,
among others. 99 For instance, a power-sharing arrangement
between the minority and the majority must reserve a
certain number of seats and positions for women from the
minority group. Similarly, an autonomous minority region
must permit the full participation of women in the political,
social, and economic life of the region. Nor can personal
laws be used to dispossess and unjustly punish or
discriminate against women.
The danger for Iraq, which was largely a secular state
under Saddam Hussein, and in which women had made
some advances, is that the domination of the state by
religious political parties could retard women's rights. That
is why the new constitution needs to be amended and
interpreted to unambiguously protect the rights of women.
Regrettably, it is vague on the rights of women and the
effect of Islam on their rights. While the equal protection
clause guarantees textual equality based on gender, it says
nothing about the conflict between particular Islamic
values and practices and women's rights. 10 Similarly, any
regimes for the protection of the rights of minorities, such
the Sunnis or the Kurds, must be subjected to CEDAW and
a Bill of Rights. Otherwise, the new dispensation will only
protect the rights of men, in effect half of the minority
populations.
CONCLUSION
Since the American invasion and occupation of Iraq in
2003, the country has been at a crossroads. Although a
repressive dictatorship was dismantled, the aftermath has
brought Iraq to the brink of disintegration. The collapse of
the regime of Saddam Hussein and the American
occupation have released competing aspirations, loyalties,
and conflicts. Tensions, which were masked by the iron
hand of the former regime, have exploded into the open.
Different Iraqi groups have responded in varying ways to
the American occupation. Nevertheless, each group seeks to
influence the character of the Iraqi state after the
99. See generally CEDAW, supra note 64.
100. See IRAQ CONST. art. 14.
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occupation. These are the sources of the conflict that is
pervasive in Iraq today. What is a legitimate Iraq state?
How will such a state be crafted, and what role will various
Iraqi groups play in it?
This Essay attempted to answer some of these
questions with a particular emphasis on the rights of
minorities. Unfortunately, Iraq has three major groups that
have different interests within the state. The fact that Iraq
has never been a political democracy means that the
institutions of accountable government and the culture of
the open society will have to be established from scratch.
These processes are further complicated by tensions and
suspicions among the groups in the context of the
occupation. What is clear, however, is the fact that the new
Iraqi constitutional dispensation, if the country is to survive
as one, will have to address adequately the question of
minorities, particularly the Sunnis and the Kurds. In a
positive development, Iraq's transitional basic law adopted
a secularist, individual rights approach in a Bill of Rights in
which equal protection norms were presumed central to the
reconstruction of the country. 0 1 In some respects, the 2005
Iraqi Constitution is step backwards from the TAL. The
legislature, which is dominated by the Shia, ought to step
back from the temptation of a theocracy and instead look to
equal protection and anti-discrimination norms coupled
with autonomy regimes for minorities as it constructs a
lasting constitutional framework. Otherwise, the failure to
address the question of minority and group rights will
result in the disintegration of Iraq as a single state.
101. LAW OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL
PERIOD (TAL) (promulgated by the U.S. Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority on
March 8, 2004).
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